by John P. Geis, II, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
A moment’s insight is sometimes worth a life’s experience.
--Oliver Wendell Holmes
The following scenario is for illustrative purposes only. It is designed to raise some of the doctrinal, strategic planning, and operational issues that directed energy weapons will pose. To posit the U.S. as the only owner of these weapons produces a rather uninteresting scenario of rapid U.S. victory. The key challenges to our future warfighting capability will occur when our opponents also possess modern weapons, and when the U.S. is responding in an expeditionary mode. This future picture is murkier, and the outcome is much less certain. The following scenario uses real places, and in some cases real people; however, it is not a prediction of what will happen, only a plausible future of what might happen.[i] It has its roots in two alternate futures from the Chief of Staff-directed study, Air Force 2025, specifically the worlds of “2015 Crossroads,” and “King Khan.”[ii]
What was called the American century has given way to the Asian Millennium.[iii] The economies of South East Asia became progressively more intertwined in the early years of the twenty-first century. By the year 2000, over seventy percent of the wealth of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore was in the hands of ethnic Chinese.[iv] The trade between the Chinese in the area and the mainland helped the mainland economy grow rapidly.[v] In late 2000, many estimated the Chinese gross domestic product to be in the neighborhood of $5.6 trillion, with annual trade with the U.S. at over $58 billion.[vi] After the economic slowdown in 2002-2004, China’s economy continued to grow at around 8 percent per year, and passed the U.S. economy in total size by 2011.[vii] By 2012, Chinese GDP passed $12 trillion on its way to the $29 trillion mark in 2025, the same year the United States economy crossed the $18 trillion threshold.[viii]
This robust economic expansion paved the way for China to modernize its military. China increased military spending over 200 percent between 1988 and 1995, and although the pace of growth has slowed somewhat, China’s defense spending continues to increase.[ix] China began a restructuring of its military in the late 1990s and continued this during the decade that followed. China began to change a mammoth military equipped with aging and dilapidated equipment into a smaller but more capable force.[x] China purchased Sovremenny-class destroyers in the late 1990s,[xi] and began construction of its first aircraft carrier in 2006. The construction of the carrier proved more difficult than expected, and the carrier and its attendant aviation wing were not completed until 2012. Seeking to bolster its force projection capability, China embarked on a program to build a new group every four years until it had seven carrier groups in its fleet. By 2025, four carrier battle groups were in operation. China was also concerned about its ability to project ground forces. A program to build new amphibious vessels was begun in 2005. Today, in 2025, China has sufficient sealift to land three divisions ashore at a point of its choosing.
Well aware of the value of asymmetric weapons, China began investing in directed energy weapons in the late twentieth century. By 2025, China had equipped her naval vessels with 50 TW pulsed laser cannons; pulsed microwave beams capable of inducing kilovolt electric fields in unprotected circuitry at distances of several tens of miles, and continuous wave microwave devices for point defense, area denial, and adversary troop incapacitation. Airborne laser systems, while less powerful, were capable of destroying a tank at ten miles, and engaging an adversary aircraft at more than 100 miles in clear weather. Microwave defense shields were in place around all military assets, capable of disintegrating the circuits of any guided weapon that approached within ten kilometers.[xii] Aware of the impact of directed energy technologies, and with asymmetric use of these technologies a central theme of their defense plans, China maintains a redundant command and control system with both digital and analog communications. Hardening against use of these devices has been incorporated into all vessels and vehicles built since 2012.
Iran began the twenty-first century in economic crisis. The national GDP had been flat from 1997-1999, and international debt had risen to over ten percent of GDP.[xiii] As oil prices rose in the spring of 2000, Iran experienced a balance of payments influx that began to bolster the economy at a rate of over five percent per year.[xiv] Iran’s economy remained tied to the fortunes of its oil exports, which served the nation well over the period. Iran had over 105 billion barrels of crude oil reserves with many regions of the nation unexplored at the beginning of the century. This was in addition to owning nearly one seventh of the world’s natural gas reserves—roughly one quadrillion cubic feet.[xv] As a result of its vast oil wealth, Iran paid off its international debt by 2007, and its economy continued to grow throughout the period. As the economies of Asia grew stronger, and as their demand for oil became greater, trade between Iran and China more than quadrupled in this period. Further, as Iran fulfilled China’s need for oil, China acted as Iran’s primary supplier for arms and a strategic partnership was formed.[xvi]
In 2025, Iran has a GDP of approximately $1.4 trillion (constant 2000 dollars), and a population approaching 120 million.[xvii] It has an armed force of over 450,000 with over 400 tanks, half equipped with directed energy weapons, and 400 combat aircraft, including two wings of recently acquired stealthy Chinese fighters. Iran has fielded a submarine fleet of an estimated 100 vessels, several of which are capable of extended silent running, and has constructed several ultra-high-energy laser and high power microwave weapons on the islands in and on the mainland around the Straits of Hormuz.[xviii] These weapons have on-site generation capability, and are tapped into the national power grid for augmentation.
The reign of King Fahd came to an end in late 2011 as a result of an uprising by the religious clergy within the kingdom. Efforts by CENTCOM Commander to maintain an American presence over the first ten years of the century received support at home and were begrudgingly accepted by King Abdullah as a continuing counterbalance to Iraq, and later to Iran.[xix] The continued presence of Americans on what was considered “Holy Ground” by most Muslims in the region continued the downward trend of stability within the Saudi Kingdom.[xx] Feeling “more is better” the plans to jointly exercise U.S. and Saudi forces developed by the CENTCOM staff only exacerbated the problems.[xxi] As a result, uprisings began in 2012, which the Saudi military forces were hard-pressed to control. In the end, the unwillingness of the Saudi army to kill their countrymen and esteemed religious clerics resulted in the toppling of the government in March 2013. The religious theocracy that came to power requested all non-believers leave Saudi soil not later than October of that year, and permanent American military presence came to an end. While the Saudi economy remains intact, and the standard of living continues to slowly improve for the Saudi people, American presence on Saudi territory appears unwelcome unless Saudi Arabia faces imminent invasion of their own territory.
The United States began the new century as the world’s one and only superpower. The tax cut package implemented in 2002, combined with increased military and homeland security spending, resulted in an end of the budget surpluses that characterized the 1990s.[xxii] Pro business lobbying and a generally conservative congress resulted in no movement within the U.S. in development of a national energy policy, or the development of more energy efficient infrastructure. The U.S. ended the year 2000 importing forty-nine percent of its domestic oil needs.[xxiii] It enters 2025 importing more than sixty percent of the oil needed to run the economy and fuel its cars, trucks, motorcycles, and aircraft.
The economy continued to grow throughout the period. The GDP rose from just under $9 trillion in 2000 to a 2025 level of nearly $19 trillion.[xxiv] Despite the robust economy, a series of tax cuts kept federal revenues relatively steady. Thus, while there was a recovery from the post cold war military drawdown, this recovery has been slow. The U.S. enters 2025 with ten full aerospace expeditionary forces, which contain the F-22, JSF, and more than twenty airborne laser attack platforms each.[xxv] The Army has succeeded in implementing much of the Joint Vision 2020 capabilities, but has only started the conversion to what was known in 2000 as the Army after Next. The Navy is back to thirteen carrier battlegroups with each major combatant ship and submarine having high energy laser and high power microwave weapons. Powered by nuclear plants, the weapons on the aircraft carriers and submarines are on par with larger fixed ground stations. Stealthy cruise missiles and stealthy aircraft predominate the air component of each of the services.
Worldwide oil production finally plateaued in 2025, peaking at 118 million barrels per day.[xxvi] Global demand continued to increase, however, and now stood at nearly 126 million barrels per day.[xxvii] The result was that on February 1, 2025, oil hit a price of ninety dollars per barrel (constant 2000 dollars) and threatened to reach $130 by midyear.
The economies of the world’s great powers were greatly strained with China and the United States facing the same basic problem. Both desired continued unimpeded economic growth--China for stability; the United States for prosperity.[xxviii] The Chinese leadership feared a breakup and fragmentation of the country if cheap oil sources for their economy could not be secured. The leadership decided to leverage its long-standing relationship with Iran to further Chinese economic needs while providing for the attainment of Iran’s long-term goal of becoming the Middle East’s greatest regional power. Similarly, the United States sought to leverage its alliances to maintain U.S. access to vital world oil supplies.
In early February, the Chinese Premier conducted a summit with the Iranian President and the leading Iranian clergy to enlist their support for continued Chinese economic growth. This summit included covert discussions of Chinese support to an Iranian attempt to increase their control over all oil flow in the Middle East. In return, Iran promised China sufficient oil to maintain their economic growth. As the summit concluded, three Chinese aircraft carrier battlegroups, nineteen major amphibious troop carriers with over 20,000 combat troops, and over fifty submarines began to steam toward the Straits of Hormuz.
On February 19, Iran announced that it would use all of its resources to supply oil solely to China. World spot market oil prices rose overnight by fifty dollars per barrel. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates indicated they would sell only to the West on February 21. Iran responded by seizing all islands in the Straits of Hormuz, and declaring that they would exercise the rights to determine which vessels may pass through the narrow straits, which they defined as the sovereign waters of Iran. Iran immediately deployed its entire submarine fleet (estimated at 100 vessels), and powered its directed energy network along its coastline.
U.S. Deployment
The President ordered a freedom of navigation exercise through the Hormuz straits. The American aircraft carrier Independence sailed through the straits the next day. The carrier was attacked by Iranian laser stations, which destroyed the carrier’s laser emitter. The carrier also sustained laser-induced gashes along the entire port side of the vessel. The gash was thirteen inches wide and stretched from stem to stern only fourteen inches above the water line. Minutes later, the Independence was attached by at least six submarines. While the subs did not sink the vessel, their torpedoes caused the carrier to take on water. As the carrier sank further, water poured through the gash along the entire length of the vessel. Four hours later, with its pumps unable to keep up with the flow of water, the quick-thinking captain ran the carrier aground off the coast of Oman to prevent the vessel from sinking. The carrier sat there, useless, listing twenty-two degrees to port. Three other major combatants also sustained severe laser induced damage and steamed out of the straits back into the Gulf of Oman. Preparations were being made to tow these vessels back to the U.S. for repair. In the aftermath, the American people and congress reacted angrily. For the first time in nearly eighty-five years, Congress declared war. Three nights later, special operations forces attacked the Iranian laser station involved. In response, Iran and China launched a massive search and destroy mission against all U.S. forces in the Gulf region.
The Secretary of Defense issued deployment orders for the 9th and 10th AEFs to the region, and activated stages I and II of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Within twenty-four hours, units from the 1st and 27th Fighter Wings and the 92d Air Reserve Wing arrived in theater.[xxix] Some bases in the region were deemed unusable due to the extended reach of the Iranian laser weapons. All facilities within seventy miles of these sites were determined to be at unacceptable risk.[xxx] The Saudi government denied other bases, as they did not perceive a threat to their sovereignty. Unaware of any threats near the bases, the heavy airlift began to arrive in theater. However, clandestine Iranian operatives used portable directed energy weapons to cause one C-17s and two civil reserve air fleet aircraft to crash while landing.[xxxi] The weapons were used to incinerate the pilots and their clothing on short final, resulting in a loss of aircraft control. In two cases, the aircraft crashed into parts of the base infrastructure. All total, more than 700 Americans died on that day alone.[xxxii] Host nation forces began to scour the countryside to find the Iranian operatives, but were able to find only one team in the following three days. The U.S. was faced with a difficult decision: whether to risk further deployments without finding all the Iranian teams, or whether to place the time phased force deployment on hold. Because the major airlines were not convinced that their assets could be adequately protected, all withdrew their fleets from the CRAF.[xxxiii]
The first aircraft and equipment arrived in Theater on February 27. Before and during the deployment process, Iran and China launched numerous stealth HPM UAVs that targeted each potential U.S. deployment base and port with periodic HPM pulse bursts. Despite host-nation attempts to fend these off, many of the microwave attacks were successful. The attacks caused damage to commercial-off-the-shelf computer equipment that now formed nearly every workstation used for administrative functions, command, and control. Aircraft on the field and near the aerodromes suffered damage as well, including two jets lost on landing. Others suffered computer systems failures because they were hit by the HPM pulses while taxiing after landing. In the end, much of the U.S. equipment arrived in theater damaged, and substantial repair and replacement of equipment was going to be necessary before an effective command and control system would be established. Fully operable base defenses including directed energy weapons finally put an end to the microwave attacks on 7 Mar, and the CFACC’s command and control network was repaired and operational one week later. As a partial solution to the microwave attacks, the CFACC initiated setup of a laser based inter-theater communications system.[xxxiv]
The CFACC ordered a naval cruise missile and UAV strike against the Iranian defenses. Iranian laser weapons destroyed the high altitude UAVs at a range of nearly seventy miles from their targets. Only a few missiles penetrated the laser detection network.[xxxv] Pulsed HPM signals emanating from Iranian installations caused over ninety percent of the cruise missile systems that defeated the laser network to fail enroute to their targets. While no casualties were sustained, only one major enemy directed energy weapon site sustained damage. The AF was left in a quandary as to how to engage fixed defenses whose firepower was in excess of anything that could be carried in the air.
In retaliation for the CFACC attempted strike, Iran turned its lasers skyward. As polar orbiting satellites passed within two degrees of latitude and longitude of a fixed Iranian laser site, the weapon was used to disable and destroy satellite components. In the first twenty-four hours, twelve U.S. satellites were destroyed or had their optical sensors rendered permanently inoperative. The U.S. president and secretary of defense threatened an overwhelming response, but were initially at a loss as to how to conduct it.
U.S. Special Forces were deployed to the theater in large numbers. Assisted by groups of “indigenous warriors” special forces teams began studying how to take down the Iranian integrated directed energy defense system.[xxxvi]
While Iranian proxies opposed the deployment and continued to conduct sporadic attacks, the Iranian forces made no further land advances. Iranian directed energy weapons effectively closed the Straits of Hormuz to all shipping not desired by Iran. The Navy regained submaritime superiority in early May.
U.S. Navy Special Forces mounted a coordinated attack on the Iranian coastal directed energy defenses. With air power unable to breach the laser defenses just inland of the Iranian coastline, underwater vehicles were used to insert Special Operations Forces. These teams targeted the directed energy installations near the Straits of Hormuz for destruction. The teams used portable HPM weapons to disrupt installation security systems, and sensor networks, used portable infrared lasers to kill at distances, and successfully breached the installations’ perimeters.[xxxvii] Explosives were planted in each facility and were detonated by the retreating teams. The teams believed all coastal installations were destroyed. Destruction of laser batteries deep inside Iran using these tactics was not possible due to the limited range of the Special Forces’ insertion vehicles. Despite the American victory, the spot market continued to increase in price, and had doubled to $180 per barrel. The U.S. tapped the strategic petroleum reserve, which kept the U.S. economy afloat, but global stock markets were falling in the uncertain atmosphere.
The deployment of forces continued for over two months. By early May, the U.S. and China each had three carrier battle groups in the region with the associated combat support vessels. The U.S. Air Force had two AEF equivalents in theater, opposed by a recently modernized Iranian Air Force, augmented by the Chinese, with a combined six fighter wings of second-generation stealth aircraft. The Army had the 82d Airborne Division, and one heavy division in theater with a sixty-day supply of combat arms. The Marines had a single MEU-SOC off shore being protected by one of the carrier battle groups. As of the fifteenth of May, neither the U.S. nor Iran had any low earth orbiting space assets left in service.
The CFACC’s first concern was gaining air supremacy. There were two problems facing him. First, many of his fighter aircraft were severely damaged in the Iranian microwave attacks during deployment, resulting in an initial mission capable rate of less than fifty percent. In many cases, avionics and flight control wiring and computer systems had to be pulled and replaced. These repairs were not only manpower intensive, but they required cannibalization of aircraft assigned to units not deploying to provide the spare parts needed to return the two AEFs to combat ready status. The second problem was how to attack the Iranian interior defenses and the Iranian Air Force, when their ground systems had a greater reach than the CFACC’s fighter resources.
This left the CFACC two options. Settle for temporary air superiority when U.S. ground forces attempt landings, or engage in what would likely be a very expensive war of attrition against the directed energy systems of Iran. The CFACC opted initially to provide air superiority over U.S. ground forces and not take on the entire Iranian defense forces.
The next phase of the CFC’s plan involved taking Iranian island and coastal territory to ensure the Straits of Hormuz were not threatened by repaired Iranian defenses the Special Operations Forces destroyed. The 82d Airborne Division attempted a landing at Abu Musa and the MEU-SOC attempted an amphibious landing at Salakh.[xxxviii] The CFACC provided fighter and Airborne Laser cover for the operation. As the C-130s laden with the 82d Airborne troops approached Abu Musa, Iranian ground forces equipped with transportable laser systems lased the cockpits on approach. As with the initial deployment, two aircraft were downed on final approach before the fighter cover could react. Lasers and kinetic kill weapons were fired from the fighter cover, destroying the ground lasers as they were detected. During this engagement, a squadron of Iranian fighter aircraft also engaged friendly forces using laser and other devices. In the end, the USAF downed twenty Iranian aircraft, but sustained the loss of fourteen, including five C-130s.
Prior to the MEU-SOC landing, and unknown to the Americans, the Iranian coastal defense authorities were able to get one laser defense installation back on line on a hill near Bander-e-Dulub, slightly more than twenty kilometers from the MEU-SOC landing site. As the landing force came within firing distance, the Iranian Air Force engaged the remaining protective air cover with lasers and beyond visual range missiles. Both sides sustained heavy losses. As the landing force approached the shore, the newly recommissioned laser battery fired on the remaining protective air cover, downing several aircraft, which caused the others to scatter. It then turned its firepower on the landing force. Within only a few minutes, the MEU’s combat power was effectively neutralized. The Marine force sustained nearly thirty percent casualties; many were vaporized or burned beyond any hope of recognition. A hastily arranged strike by several dozen missiles overwhelmed the site’s ability to defend itself and again took the laser site out of commission. The Marines gathered their dead; over 500 body bags were filled. More challenging for mortuary affairs was what to do approximately 220 Marines who were killed but whose disintegration left no remains.
In retaliation for the landing, the Iranian defense force launched a 300-kiloton nuclear weapon and detonated it approximately sixty-five miles over Kuwait City.[xxxix] The detonation caused virtually no damage at the surface and though a brief burst of neutron radiation was detectable, it fell well below lethal limits. However, the detonation sent a current through every electrical wire within several hundred miles of the detonation site. Virtually every computer component within the Middle East Theater that was not located in a hardened site was destroyed. The Expeditionary Air Force units, who deployed to bare bases in tent like facilities, suffered near total loss of all computer and communications capabilities. Much of the theater command and control center was effectively destroyed, though the laser piece of the communications system remained operative. Most allied aircraft sustained damage to their computer-controlled systems. More than seventy percent of the aircraft in theater were non-mission capable, but due to the command and control difficulties, the leadership in the U.S. remained unaware of the extent of the problem for nearly a day.
The U.S. responded with the Carrier Task Force from the Far East. It arrived four days later and was able to launch retaliatory strikes on Iran. Meanwhile, the Chinese carrier groups now also in the Middle East launched attacks on the U.S. Carrier Groups, only to be shot down at great range by the directed energy weapons on-board the U.S. ships.
The U.S. began with a nuclear EMP detonation over the center of Iran, and then followed up the attack with a series of cruise missile attacks on the directed energy installations.[xl] This attack was successful since the Iranian systems were down due to the EMP strike. Air Force and Naval fighter and attack assets then began a slow parallel takedown of the Iranian electrical generation capacity, which was a key node in their directed energy defenses. With Iran’s defensive directed energy technologies now reduced, a parallel warfare program was launched against the Iranian leadership and their communications, commensurate with the available combat ready assets in theater.
In response to the U.S. attack, Iran and China began an all out assault with what was left of their submarine fleet. This minor battle took on a more traditional and conventional flavor. It took only three weeks for the U.S. forces to locate and destroy the Iranian submarines. Before that occurred, the Iranians and Chinese managed to sink four more surface combatants and severely damage one more aircraft carrier. In the end, the U.S. succeeded in eliminating the Iranian submarine threat and partly reopened the Straits of Hormuz. By the end of July, over 35,000 Americans had died, and another 47,000 were injured. Worse, the major shipping lanes were awash in obstacles as a result of the sinking of the vessels. By this point, the American people were frustrated and the anti-war protest movement was clearly gaining momentum. Material losses in the Department of Defense had already exceeded $35 billion, operations costs were over $90 billion, oil prices were still rising, and American servicemen were coming home in body bags by the thousands.
During the submarine wars, Iran began to put its power generation capacity back on line. They began in the Teheran region, but concealed the actual status by leaving the power grid un-powered.[xli] With the two laser batteries guarding the capital repaired, on September 2, the lights in Teheran came back on. The Iranians used these batteries to keep enemy aircraft from attacking within a seventy-mile radius of the capital. Near the borders of this circle, the Iranian military constructed new laser batteries, and extended the power supply system, gradually expanding the area under the laser umbrella. While the CFACC attempted to attack these batteries, bi-static radars, and laser sensors enabled detection of the attacking systems. Dozens of cruise missiles, UAVs and bomber aircraft were destroyed in the attempts to keep the Iranians from reconstructing their defense network. Within three months, the original defense network was restored, and laser batteries on mountains overlooking the Straits of Hormuz were occasionally operational once again. In the New Year, the war degenerated into a quasi-stalemate. While the U.S. had the upper hand, Iran used directed energy weapons to wage a campaign of terror against vessels transmitting the straits. While the straits remained “open,” many ship captains were unwilling to attempt passage.
Over one year after the start of the conflict, the administration felt it was losing the support of the American people. Saudi Arabia offered to broker a cease-fire between the U.S. and Iran. There was no peace, only a cease-fire…and Iran still insisted on selling all its oil to China. In the end, the incumbent administration elected to create a comprehensive energy policy aimed at achieving energy independence at home.
[i] The value of plausible scenarios is described at length in Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View, Doubleday Publishers, New York, New York, 1991, 257 pp.
[ii] Englebrecht, Joseph A.; Bivins, Robert L.; Condray, Patrick M.; Fecteau, Merrily D.; Geis, John P. II; and Smith, Kevin C.; Alternate Futures for 2025, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL, September 1996, 236pp.
[iii] The term “American Century” was coined by LeFeber, Walter in The American Century: American Foreign Policy Since the 1890s. See LeFeber, Walter, “The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750, W. W. Norton Publishers, New York, New York, 1898, 759 pp.
[iv] Large amounts of Chinese populate these countries. For specifics, see Hook, Brian and Twitchett, Denis, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1991, p. 86. Chinese own 70-75 percent of the non-governmental assets in Indonesia, and over 90 percent in Thailand and Taiwan. Yanan, Ju, “China: The Fourth Power,” The Officer, December 1994, p. 31
[v] Selimuddin, Abu, “China: The Biggest Dragon of All?” USA Today, September 1994, p. 175
[vi] Morrison, Wayne, M., Congressional Research Service, IB98014: China's Economic Conditions, September 21, 2000, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/inter-10.html#_1_11
[vii] Ibid. Morrison extrapolates China’s current growth rate which causes it to pass the United States in total size in the 2007-08 timeframe. It is important to note that China’s economy is projected to do this at an 8-9 percent annual growth rate, which is nearly triple, the growth rate of the American economy. In this scenario, the author has adjusted the date by a few years to account for the economic slowdown underway at the time of publication, even though this slowdown seems to be affecting the U.S. more than it is China.
[viii] This projection is based on a slowing of the Chinese economic growth rate to an average of only 8 percent over this timeframe. If the U.S. can sustain its current growth rate of 3.5 for this same period, the U.S. GDP in 2025 will be $19.6 billion.
[ix] Chanda, Nyan, “Fear of the Dragon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1995, p. 24
[x] Nolt, James H., The China-Taiwan Military Balance, Taiwan Security Research, January 2000, available at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-012000-Nolt.htm
[xii] Howard, Russell D., The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army: "Short Arms and Slow Legs, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper No. 28, September 1999 Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ocp28.htm. Howard talks about current Chinese defense policy as emphasizing modernization especially in areas such as C3I and directed energy. The level of development in these fields is an extension of the rationale in parts 2 and 3 of this paper, based on the emphasis levels Howard details.
[xvi] Department of Energy Report EIA-0484, World Oil Markets, March 31, 2000 available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html. The report projects increased ties between the Middle Eastern nations and China as China’s energy consumption grows through the period.
[xvii] GDP computed based on 1999 figure of $347.6 billion in purchasing power parity taken from CIA World Factbook 2000, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html. This was extrapolated toward 2000 at a constant growth rate of 5.1 percent, which is the Department of Energy’s projected growth rate for Iran over the near term. See also Iran, Background Paper by the Department of Energy, October 2000. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html
[xviii] This includes the disputed islands of Tunb al Kubra, Abu Musa, and Tunb As Sughra.
[xx] Ibid. The State Department mentions areas of instability within Saudi Arabia in its 1998 Fact Sheet. American presence continues to be a source of disenfranchisement among the religious of the region.
[xxi] A senior flag officer and Pentagon strategic planner, under the rubric of academic non-attribution, stated that without exception, Theater Combatant Commanders today view “More is Better” as the theme for Theater Engagement. This speaker further indicated that little thought is given to the quality of the engagement or its long-term effects in many cases. Lecture presented to the AWC Class of 2001 in November 2000.
[xxii] This is based on the Republican tax cut proposals put forth in the 2000 election campaign. The Office of Management and Budget believes that federal spending caps will not remain for the 2000-2010 timeframe. Based on that assumption, deficits of $47 billion will be accrued over this ten-year period if the tax cuts are passed. The result will be a continuation of the constraints over U.S. defense spending. For more information see: “New Democrats Oppose Fiscally Irresponsible Tax Cut,” available at http://www.house.gov/dooley/msg7-19-99.html, p. 1, 12 Dec 2000
[xxiv] Figure of $20 trillion is a slightly generous extrapolation from U.S. government projections of a GDP of $15.775 trillion in 2020. Table of GDP growth is available from “International Gross Domestic product, Population, and General Conversion Factors,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/tbla1_a8.html#a3, 12 December 2000. Extrapolation of current growth rates yields a 2025 GDP of $19.6 trillion.
[xxv] This paper posits the same AEF organization structure will exist in 2025 as exists today, though the AEFs of 2025 will be equipped with more modern weapon systems.
[xxvii] Derived from a 2020 estimate from the International Energy Agency’s publication World Energy Outlook, Executive Summary, available at http://www.iea.org/weo/execsum.pdf. The 2020 estimate was adjusted to 2025 by the mean growth rate of 1.9 percent.
[xxviii] Wong, John, China’s Economy in 1998: Maintaining Growth and Staving off the Asian Contagion, April 1999, 48pp. Wong raises the specter of inadequate growth in China could cause a breakdown in stability.
[xxix] Units in accordance with the current Expeditionary Aerospace Force Detail Concept Paper available at http://www.af.mil/eaf and the lead wings as currently assigned.
[xxx] The Iranian lasers are posited to be line of sight weapons. The curvature of the earth is approximated by the formula d2/8R where d is the distance across the surface of the earth and R is the radius of the earth. Using this formula, at 100 miles distance (approximately the width of the Persian Gulf), an Iranian ground based laser would be able to hit and destroy all aircraft flying at altitudes above 1650 feet.
[xxxi] This is postulated as a near simultaneous attack (within an hour or so of each other), and it takes at least this much time for the U.S. coalition forces to ascertain how the aircraft were attacked.
[xxxii] Figure derived from 2 Boeing 747s worth of military personnel deploying into theater, crew of the C17, and more than 100 ground casualties caused by aircraft crashing into the base proper.
[xxxiii] Title 10 Section 9511-9513 details the law on Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft. While these aircraft are under contract to the federal government, the only penalty specified in this code for withdrawal of aircraft from the fleet is a reimbursement to the government for contract money received with an additional penalty. Given the poor survivability of the CRAF missions in this scenario, airlines could view these losses as a breach of contract and the Title 10 code that states that safety of the CRAF fleet is a top priority.
[xxxiv] Laser communication is not new. Several companies have undertaken the development of laser based communications. A recent web search revealed over 100 on line. Discussions with Paul Westmeyer, Chief Systems Engineer in NASA Goddard’s Earth Program Office indicates that miniaturized laser communications will be possible before the 2020 timeframe; that these devices will be able to be networked together to provide reliable in theater communications and these devices will be relatively immune to microwave effects.
[xxxv] Lasers here are envisioned to be a primary sensor. A laser device can be used to conduct a multi-bar raster scan looking for targets. This scan is conducted by moving the laser rapidly back and forth across the sky looking for reflected light returns. Only those vehicles that are stealthy in the visible spectrum (no such vehicles in service or planned as of Dec 2000) will be able to defeat such a sensor system. Resolution of such a system could easily exceed the best synthetic aperture radars. Such a sensor system is what enables the airborne laser laboratory to detect and identify missiles only a couple of feet across at distances of several hundred kilometers. Identification of aircraft, which have cross sections, ten times larger, would thus be possible at several thousand kilometers distance. Cruise missiles would easily be detectable out to line of sight.
[xxxvi] Indigenous Warriors is a USSOCOM Future Concept Working Group (FCWG) concept. The basic idea is that special forces will deliberately recruit persons of various ethnic backgrounds and train these people to a high degree of cultural and language proficiency for the countries of their ancestry. When necessary, these troops can use this knowledge to enhance their chances for survival in combat situations.
[xxxvii] The use of IR lasers here has two purposes. First, an infrared band laser cannot be seen, even at night, with the unaided eye. Some IR lasers will not be visible, even with advanced night vision devices. This enables a silent lethal shot, taken at long range, which would contribute to a special operations team remaining undetected. Sensor technology, posited to improve over the next 20 years will likely reduce the use of more traditional SOF tactics such as gun silencers, throat slitting, etc…
[xxxviii] Both locations are strategic is lands in the Persian Gulf very close to the transit lanes through the Straits of Hormuz
[xxxix] Iran’s first attempt was shot down by the theater air defense system. Iran’s second attempt saturated the system with over 20 missiles, in order to get one “leaker” through.
[xl] The reader may wonder why this tactic was not pursued earlier. Among the assumptions in this scenario, and the AF 2025 study on which it was based, is that the U.S. would not escalate to nuclear weapons use, unless an opponent used WMD. Thus, the President would not likely approve the tactic of a nuclear airburst over Iran unless Iran first used some form of weapon of mass destruction against allied forces.
[xli] Iran did this as a countermeasure to future attacks based on the concept of “Effects-Based Targeting” put forth by Major General Dave Deptula, USAF.
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